Classroom Study Material

SECURITY

July 2017 – September 20th 2017
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1. SINO-INDIA BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE

Why in News?
- Under the present government, border infrastructure development has moved forward but still pace of development at Sino-India border is slow.

Background
- According to several military and intelligence sources, India is at least a decade away from matching the infrastructure on the Chinese side, where most posts have direct road access.
- Across Tibet, massive infrastructure projects have come up providing easy access to the border for the Chinese military. China can dispatch several divisions to the LAC within a few days while India needs to position more troops in proximity to the epicenter of crisis so that can intervene rapidly.
- China has developed a network of internal highways and feeder roads in Tibet region which connects all strategic places on all its southern borders.
- Chinese government has also undertaken a large-scale effort to upgrade air, roads and rail infrastructure, as well as surveillance capabilities near to the border. Currently it has built 15 fully-operational airbases in Tibet region.

Issues at Sino-India border
- Sporadic aggression on Sino-border e.g. 1962 war
- Cross border safe houses for insurgent in north eastern neighbours
- Land boundary disputes in Arunachal Pradesh. Recently, Beijing unilaterally renamed six places here.
- Lack of critical infrastructure for eg. delay in border roads development, absence of single force command and integrated check posts etc.
- The major reasons for the delay are limited working season combined with logistic issues due to very high altitude and mountainous, rugged and difficult terrain, natural calamities, delay in forest and wildlife clearances, land acquisition and so on.
- Time overruns even in the wake of recent standoff at Doklam - the total of 73 roads which were to be completed by 2012, have been further postponed to 2022, which is alarming for the Army. It is partially due to manpower shortage in BRO which is entrusted with constructing 61 out of these 73 roads.

Steps taken by the government
- India is also constructing some critical bridges in the northeast which will cut down time for troop movement. The recently inaugurated 9.2-km Dhola-Sadiya bridge will cut down the distance between Assam and Arunachal Pradesh by 165 km.
- A steering committee has been set up under the chairmanship of the Secretary (Border Management) in the Home Ministry to review and monitor the progress of construction of these roads.
Student Notes:

- India announced the construction of two Advanced Landing Grounds (ALG) at Tawang and Dirang in Arunachal Pradesh
- To contain China, India and Japan have joined hands to aggressively develop infrastructure projects in North east
- Army infrastructure projects within 100Km of LAC have been exempted from forest clearance.
- To expedite border road construction, Ministry of Defence has decided to delegate administrative and financial powers to the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) right up to the level of Chief Engineer and Task Force Commander. Beffing up of administrative and financial powers can help BRO come with desired outcomes according to the requirements of the army.

2. THE IMPORTANCE OF PANGONG TSO

Why in News?
- Recently, Indian and Chinese armies clashed along the Pangong lake in Ladakh.

Strategic Importance
- The Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China passes through the lake. However, both countries have not yet agreed on the exact location of the LAC.
- At present, India controls around 45-km long western part of the lake (1/3rd part) and the rest is controlled by China. Most of the clashes between the two armies occur in the disputed portion of the lake.
- It lies in the path of the Chushul Valley in Ladakh, one of the main approaches that China can use for an offensive into Indian-held territory. During the 1962 war, China launched its main offensive here.

Related Information
- For the first time, PLA skipped the ceremonial border meetings on Independence Day since 2005, which was decided to be

About Pangong Lake
- Pangong Tso is a long narrow, deep, landlocked lake located at a height of over 14,000-feet in the Ladakh Himalaya and around 1300-km west of Sikkim.
- It is a brackish water lake freezes over in winter, and becomes ideal for ice skating and polo.
- It is not a part of Indus river basin area.
- The lake is in the process of being identified under the Ramsar Convention as a wetland of international importance. This will be the first trans-boundary wetland in South Asia under the convention.
held twice in a year following the signing of the Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas.

- Meeting provided an opportunity for a thaw between the two sides, as part of a system that had been useful in building confidence over the years and reducing tensions on the border.

### 3. EVIDENCE BASED POLICING (EBP): POLICE REFORM

**Why in news?**

- The recent international conference organised by the Institute of Criminology at Cambridge University heightened the need of Evidence Based Policing.

**Background**

- Policing in India is based on archaic British control and suffers from political interference.
- The research on policing is in dismal state due to indifferent attitude of law makers.
- Government emphasizes solely on the mechanical use of police resources rather than an intelligent application of available skills.

**Why EBP is needed?**

- The twin problems of maintaining public order and combating conventional crime are difficult to be tackled by traditional approach of targeting, testing and tracking.
- Changing nature of crime in society (Cyber Crime) demands a shift from traditional based approach of policing toward more robust research based approach.
- EBP allows the police agencies to move beyond a reactive, response-driven approach and moves away from post-mortem approach of crime.
- The strategy is one of identifying ‘hot spots’ of crime and spotting problematic individuals in a community.

### 4. ARMY REFORMS

**Why in news**

- Ministry of Defence, in consultation with the Indian Army, has decided to reform the Indian Army in a planned manner to

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**Past Structural Reforms in Armed Forces**

**After 1962 India-china War:** An increase in the size of the army from 5,50,000 to 8,25,000 and the raising of six mountain divisions and a new command headquarters.

**Krishna Rao Committee (1975):** It led to the mechanisation of the army along with strategic reorientation. It revolutionised India’s war waging potential, particularly in the Punjab and Rajasthan theatres.
enhance its combat capability and optimize expenditure on the lines of Lt General D B Shekhatkar Panel recommendations.

Need for reform in India:

- **Conventional challenge (state-to-state):** Threats faced by a nation from another nation that impinge on its sovereign integrity, trade, maritime area under its jurisdiction. For India, these are a result of unresolved borders and continuing inimical actions by adversaries.

- **Sub-Conventional Challenges:** Threats other than conventional threats such as terrorism, insurgency, piracy, natural disasters, drug trafficking, smuggling, illegal immigrants, changes in the climate etc. It necessitates the active employment of a substantially large force, both army and central police. Eg: The raising of Rashtriya Rifles (RR), NDRF etc.

- **Emergence of Hybrid warfare:** The nature of threats and challenges has undergone a transformation in the recent past like economic and cyber warfare. These have questioned the undue focus on extensive standing armies with multiple strike corps, which are unlikely to be employed as envisaged in 1960’s.

- **Scarce Resources:** The scale of the existing challenges at hand and the limited availability of resources have repeatedly laid bare the reality of shortages in critical areas like reserves in ammunition, special force capability development and intelligence resources (CAG 2017 report).

- **Lack of intelligence support:** A constrained national strategic vision and weak institutional structures were responsible for the failure to improve intelligence collection, collation and analysis, take up systematic capability development, and create joint training, planning and fighting institutions. Eg: the Joint Intelligence Committee ineffectiveness in providing information at crucial stages.

- **Lack of unity of command:** Each arm of the state perceives threats and challenges in its own way which in times of threat leads to hasty coordination for finding a quick fix solution. It often ends up in poor implementation & failure in achieving economies of effort.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Highlights of CAG 2017 report</th>
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<td>- Stockholding of 55% types of ammunition was below the MARL.</td>
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<td>- Around 50% of types of ammunition available were for less than 10 days of war fighting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- As of September 2016, 40% types of ammunition were still in critical level.</td>
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<td>- Shortfall in meeting the production target by Ordnance Factory Board continued and majority of the procurement during 2009-13 were pending.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Strategic missile systems of the Indian Air Force (IAF) for the China border have not been inducted till now.</td>
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<td>- Missiles supplied by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) were low in quality such as;</td>
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<tr>
<td>o lower than required velocity.</td>
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<td>o moisture ingress in 71 missiles.</td>
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<td>o reduced warranty periods due to their non-induction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The missile system was not yet inducted at any of the six locations in Eastern Air Command due to delay in creation of infrastructure at the sites.</td>
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<th>War Wastage Reserve (WWR)</th>
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<td>Reserve of ammunition for meeting the requirements of 40 days of intense war</td>
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<th>Minimum Accepted Risk Level (MARL)</th>
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<td>A bottom line requirement of 20 days of war fighting.</td>
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<td>It is minimum inescapable requirement of the ammunition all times to meet operational preparedness.</td>
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- **Poor Border Infrastructure**: India failed to build infrastructure that could support a cohesive defensive battle, and logistic establishments to facilitate faster buildup which was even acknowledged by our former Defence minister on the floor of Parliament.

- **Greed for power**: Officials often tend to engage debate around allocation of funds and numbers of senior ranks that must at least be protected if not enlarged, rather than finding the optimum solution for the challenge at hand.

- **Resiliency to Reform**: The process of reforms is often constrained by the temptation to address limited peripheral issues and tendency to defer big core changes for reasons like lack of political consensus, etc.

**Accepted Recommendation and Significance of Lt General D.B. Shekatkar committee**

- **Improve operational efficiency of the Army**: Redeployment and Restructuring of approximately 57,000 posts of officers, soldiers and civilians in the Army, to **improve teeth to tail ratio** i.e. increase the number of soldiers actually doing the fighting against those needed to support them to fight.

- **Judicious use of resources** by optimization of supply, transport and ordnance infrastructure and the closure of 39 military farms and several military postal departments in so-called peace locations.

- **Saving**: Implementation will result in significant saving of manpower, funds (Rs25,000 crore over the following five years) and infrastructure.

- It will free manpower to **raise new combat units** and increase the strength of existing units.

**Other Major Defence reform committee**

**Arun Singh committee on Defence Expenditure**: It recommended first genuinely integrated Long-Term 15-year Defence Plan

**Kargil Review Committee (KRC) 2001**: Established after Kargil war (1999), and was tasked to recommend measures which were considered necessary to safeguard national security against armed intrusions.

**Naresh Chandra Committee (2011)**: It was appointed a decade after KRC to review its recommendations, their implementations and to suggest new steps to reform the security establishment. It recommended:

- **New post of Intelligence** Advisor to assist the NSA and the National Intelligence Board on matters relating to coordination in the functioning of intelligence committee

- A permanent Chairman of the **Chiefs of Staff Committee**

- **Amendment to Prevention of Corruption Act** to reassure honest officers, who take important decisions about defence equipment acquisition, so that they are not harassed for errors of judgement or decision taken in good faith.

**Way Forward**

There is a genuine fear in the defence services that by choosing to act on proposals internal to personnel management of the army, it has only picked the low-hanging fruit. The toughest recommendations of both the Arun Singh Committee, following the Kargil Review Commission, and of the Naresh Chandra Committee which required major structural changes were never implemented. Thus, future course of action should be based on following considerations:

- **Long-term strategic assessment**: It should become the basis for the change and re-prioritization of resources towards the challenges including in conventional domain,
terrorism, and non-traditional like HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) and cyber-attacks.

- **Support from the political establishment to steer the change**: to ensure implementation of the reforms according to the visionary and professional advice of the services.
- **Revamping of Security architecture of country**: to include deployment of “soldiers” with different skill-sets for non-traditional domains along with the Three Services, Ministry of Defence.
- **Develop Strategy to protect India’s core national interests beyond its borders**: This includes safety of Indians working in regions like West Asia, protection of economic and energy supply lines & assets, contribution to UN peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations and HADR missions.
- **Special Forces command**: To undertake tasks beyond the tactical domain as it becomes imperative in an environment where punitive, clinical, offensive actions may need to be undertaken without resorting to a large-scale deployment of forces in conventional mode.
- **Chief Of Defence Staff**: To improve jointness in military command by integration of the present tri-service approach in projects and resource sharing.
- **Creation of a cyber and space commands** to tackle threats in cyber and space, with a capability of both defensive and offensive actions.
- **Other measures**: includes strong institutional structures, continuity in strategic decision making of successive governments, efficient logistical support base to fight a faster paced, shorter and more efficient limited war.

## 5. ACCOUNTABILITY IN DEFENCE PROCUREMENTS

**Why in news?**

- Recently, Central Information Commission (CIC) advised the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to ensure probity and accountability in defence procurements.

**Current situation in defence procurements**

- **Delays at every stage in procurement process** – from opening of the technical offer after submission of the bids, conducting field trials, to awarding the contract & releasing the payments.
- **Rejection not explained** - The reasons for retraction of the Request for Proposal (RFP), especially at later stages in the process, is not given. Thus, making the future deals less attractive for the vendors for a substantial amount of time and money is involved.
- **Non-disclosure of important information under Section 4 of RTI** – Only routine information is available on the RTI portal of the ministry, but section 4 also requires public authorities to publish all relevant facts and provide reasons while formulating important policies or announcing the decisions which affect the public. For example – explaining introduction of the Indigenously Designed Developed and Manufactured (IDDM) category in procurement

**In Section 2 (f) of the RTI Act, ‘information’ includes ‘any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force’.

**Section 8 (1) (a)** exempts ‘information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence’.

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Measures to be taken

- **Proactive disclosures** after identifying all areas of general interest through applications received under the RTI Act through engaging experienced consultants as Transparency Officers
- **Quick response to the stake-holders’ queries** - within maximum of 30 days for disposal of applications as specified under Section 7 of RTI
- **Better management of requests** under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) - by notifying one Central Public Information Officers (CPIOs) to which the request for information should be addressed unlike existing 80 CPIOs in ministry.
- **Denying information in rare cases** – Section 2(f) includes vast variety of information. Thus, only when information necessarily falls under Section 8(1)(a) of the RTI Act, should it be denied.

### 6. INSURANCE COVER FOR DIGITAL TRANSACTION FRAUDS

#### Why in News?
- Government is examining the possibility of providing insurance cover for digital transaction.

#### Why insurance is needed?
- Economy is going cashless with the population of 1.3 billion and more than 50 percent of total users are going to plastic money for the first time.
- RBI data shows that nearly fifteen thousand cases related to ATM, credit, debit card and net banking fraud were reported in 2014-15 and 2015-16.
- No single institutional mechanism to tackle and compensate the digital transaction fraud.
- The Banking Codes and Standards Board of India prescribed certain threshold amount with one time compensation in case of fraud.
- Banking infrastructure is not robust to cope up with rising digital crime, for instance, 75 % of total Credit/Debit card are based on magnetic strip which are easy to be cloned.
- Chandrababu Naidu Committee pointed out that the apprehension about digital transaction among people can be curtailed by providing insurance coverage.

#### Type of risk
- **Device related risk**: loss of mobile phone could compromise the e-wallet security.
- **Risk from rights access**: Connecting the e-wallets or other fin-tech apps with other apps like social networks could pose a risk of data leakage or a consumer unknowingly sharing information.
- **Negligence** in sharing passwords or OTP (one time passwords) with others especially when using these modes publicly.

### 7. NATIONAL CYBER COORDINATION CENTRE (NCCC)

#### Why in news?
- The first phase of National Cyber Coordination Centre has been made operational now.

#### Key features
- NCCC is a multi-stakeholder body and comes under Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) at Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology.

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**Section 69B of IT Act, 2000**, talks about the power to authorize to monitor and collect traffic data or information through any computer resource for Cyber Security.
• It derives its powers as per provisions of section 69B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Rules notified under it.
• It will scan the country’s web traffic to detect real-time cyber security threats and alert various organisations as well as internet service providers for timely action.
• It also will coordinate between intelligence agencies, specifically during network intrusions and cyber-attacks.
• It will virtually be in touch with the control room of all Internet Service Provider (ISPs), flowing at the point of entry and exit, including international gateways.

8. ADVANCED MRSAM

Why in news?
• The Indian Army has signed a MoU with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to raise one regiment of the advanced Medium Range Surface to Air Missiles (MRSAM)

About MRSAM
• It is an advanced, all weather, mobile, land-based air defence system.
• It is capable of engaging multiple aerial targets at ranges of more than 50 km.
• The system will be jointly developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and DRDO with the involvement of private sectors and DPSUs. The system will have majority indigenous content, giving boost to the Make-in-India initiative.
• The MRSAM is a land-based variant of the long-range surface-to-air missile (LRSAM) or Barak-8 naval air defence system, which is designed to operate from naval vessels.